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 The client of this thesis was VEO OY. The objective was to study IEC 62443 
standard parts 2-3 and 2-4, and whitelisting as a cyber security measure. The aim 
was to study these parts and focus on material useful to VEO in improving cyber 
security for future projects, and to be involved in a project where a whitelisting 
environment is applied to one system. 
Studying cyber security needs a strong background, therefore some of the basis of 
cyber security was covered from industrial point of view. These were the most 
common threats, countermeasures, networking and whitelisting. 
The objective of the thesis was reached and the most important areas of the cho-
sen standard are covered. This material should prove itself useful in future pro-
jects. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The increasing use of COTS (Commercial Off-The-Shelf) products in the industrial 
world has vastly increased the possibility of cyber-attacks on industrial systems. 
The importance of cyber security continues to grow and product manufacturers and 
system integrators have to ensure that their products fill the security needs of both 
the customer and the industrial community in question. Industrial communities have 
created several cyber security standards to be used by product manufacturers and 
their customers. This thesis focuses on the IEC 62443 cyber security standard parts 
2-3 and 2-4. 
This thesis is done for VEO Oy. VEO Oy, founded in 1989 under the name Vaasa 
Engineering Oy, produces industrial automation, control and distribution systems 
for heavy industry customers, such as power plants.  
The goal of the thesis is to study the chosen parts of the standard and cover the parts 
that matter in designing IACS (Industrial Automation and Control System) and to 
observe how application whitelisting is used at VEO. IACS, Industrial Automation 
and Control Systems, are systems used in big industrial sites, e.g. power plants.  
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2 OVERVIEW OF THE THESIS 
This thesis focuses on IEC 62443 Standards 2-3 and 2-4, patch management in 
IACS and security program requirements for IACS service providers respectfully. 
This thesis will examine the basics of cyber security but focus on patch management 
and security program requirements as presented in the standard. The aim of this 
thesis is to study the two parts of the standard and whitelisting as an alternative to 
anti-virus software in industrial systems. 
IACS is an abbreviation of Industrial Automation and Control Systems, sometimes 
called ICS, Industrial Control Systems. This abbreviation leaves away automation 
which at VEO is present in every system. These are large systems that consist of a 
wide variety of commercial devices, networking, servers and PLCs (Programmable 
Logic Controller); therefore every system is different but built for the same purpose.  
Part 2-3 of the standard is about patch management. It can be used to improve ex-
isting patch management systems to match the standard or to establish a new one. 
The standard goes through the risks involved in patching devices, how to setup a 
patch management system and gives a standard way for companies to transfer in-
formation about their patches. It is aimed at asset owners, service providers and 
product suppliers. 
Part 2-4 of the standard is about security program requirements for an IACS. It 
provides a comprehensive guide about different security capabilities for a system 
and using the maturity level system that is also introduced in this section, companies 
can make lists of requirements for a system they want, and suppliers can make a list 
to answer how well their systems fill those requirements.  
VEO is applying cyber security measures into its control systems and one of the 
countermeasures currently applied is whitelisting. It is used as an alternative to anti-
virus software in industrial environments.  
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3 CYBER SECURITY  
Cyber security is the protection of computer systems, the software, the hardware, 
and the information stored on them, as well as processes controlled by them /9/. For 
a long time the industrial world was disconnected from the internet, operating with 
specialized hardware and software, however this is no longer the case. Increasing 
use of commercial products and the introduction of the internet to industrial systems 
has made them vulnerable to every threat faced by commercial users. /1/  
3.1 Objectives 
The main objective of cyber security is to secure assets. The CIA triad, standing for 
confidentiality, Integrity and Availability, is an information security model for or-
ganizations, and it is widely used /11/, /13/. These can also be applied to cyber 
security. While cyber security covers the protection to everything connected to in-
formation systems, information security is normally meant to cover only infor-
mation on systems /12/.  
Confidentiality is ensuring that data is only accessed by authorized personnel inside 
the organization. This data is also usually categorized based on how valuable the 
data is. Confidentiality can be enabled in various ways, using e.g. encryption, pass-
words, disconnected storage. While most still use a user ID with single password, 
two-factor authentication is becoming more common. /11/, /13/ 
“Integrity involves maintaining the consistency, accuracy, and trustworthiness of 
data over its entire life cycle./13/” This means that the data has to be secured when 
transmitted. This can be accomplished with file permissions, UAC (User Access 
Control) and file versions. All data should be backed up in case of major system 
failures. /11/, /13/ 
Availability means that the data should be easily accessible by authorized personnel. 
This is best accomplished by constant system maintenance and sufficient commu-
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nication bandwidth. Network security equipment can guard against denial-of-ser-
vice attacks that are meant to slow the communication capabilities of the targeted 
organization. /11/, /13/ 
3.2 Threats 
It is argued that two of the most common types of threats on a system are non-
validated changes to system and accidental actions. Non-validated changes can oc-
cur from changes or updates to operating systems, software, hardware and different 
configurations. Accidents usually happen when a person not familiar with correct 
procedures operates the system and unwillingly causes a risk. /1/ 
Threat agents, sometimes called attackers, come in different forms. Examples of 
threat agents are insider, outsider and natural. Insider is a person who is trusted in 
the environment, usually working for one of the participating companies. Insiders 
can be malicious or they can pose a threat by bypassing protocols without the in-
tention to do harm. Outsider is a person or a group from outside the targeted organ-
ization. Natural threat agent is a natural event e.g. earthquake or a flood. /1/ 
Threats are either passive or active. Passive threats consist of different kinds of 
information gathering. Information gathering can be done simply by engaging in a 
casual conversation an employee, though this is much easier if the threat agent is 
also an employee. Outsiders are able to gather information by observing routines. 
Passive information gathering can also be done digitally, usually by sniffing. Sniff-
ing is a term for monitoring data from a communication stream. Sniffing can be 
done on many kinds of networks and the equipment for sniffing is widely available. 
/1/ 
Active threats require the attacker to do something other than just observing. These 
types of threats range from disabling communications with denial-of-service attacks 
to physical attacks on industrial equipment. The most dangerous active threat is 
malicious code, Stuxnet being the most known amongst the industry. Stuxnet was 
targeted mainly at the Iranian nuclear enrichment program and is estimated to have 
destroyed 10% of Iran’s centrifuges. Stuxnet was initially spread using a USB flash 
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drive, and it used several zero-day exploits. “A zero day exploit is a cyber attack 
that occurs on the same day a weakness is discovered in software./10/” It was also 
the first known cyber threat to target PLC’s /6/. These kinds of threats, though ex-
tremely dangerous, are also possibly the rarest threat. Complex code is usually de-
veloped by an organization and they need reasons to deploy their code to attack. 
Although these can be developed by small hacker groups, it is much more common 
for those groups to rely on denial-of-service attacks as they are cheap and easy to 
execute. The most common threats are the same that everyone faces almost daily. 
Phishing and spoofed email headers are very common, but they are usually filtered 
by the email service provider. /1/ 
3.3 Countermeasures 
Preparing against cyber threats can be a hard task. In home systems it is possible to 
set up a software or hardware firewall and antivirus software. Knowing what sites 
to visit and what links to click is vital in avoiding malware and viruses. Antivirus 
software only protects from known viruses and, therefore, protection against zero-
day exploits is virtually impossible. If a device has caught a malicious piece of code, 
several programs can be used to clean your system. Some viruses are persistent and 
in some extreme cases the whole system has to be reinstalled to get rid of the virus. 
In the industrial world many more countermeasures can be taken. The countermeas-
ures that should be used depend on the types of threats each asset owner and product 
supplier faces. Countermeasures come in many different forms. A specific counter-
measure is usually needed for a specific threat, e.g. to prevent an outsider sticking 
an infected USB flash drive into one of the systems computers, the facility needs 
physical security and access control. Some passive threats like sniffing are very 
difficult to detect, because they only listen the passing communications. This type 
of information leakage can be prevented by encrypting the important data and com-
munication. /1/ 
3.4 Networks 
All the devices in an IACS are connected to each other with a network. The network 
is part of the IACS and designing it properly can increase the security capabilities 
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of the IACS. For a long time the control system network was disconnected from the 
internet and used only its own network inside the facility. When control systems 
were first connected to the internet, they had no security measures. When the need 
for security was noticed, the control networks were separated from the enterprise 
network with a single firewall (figure 1.).  
 
Figure 1: Plant network with one firewall /1/ 
 
Breaching this single firewall would compromise the whole system. Modern system 
networks are built using zones and conduits (figure 2.).  
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Figure 2: Zoned plant network /1/ 
The system designer makes a list of all devices in the IACS and divides them into 
different zones. Zones are defined by grouping assets with similar security require-
ments. This process is also called network segmentation. The conduits represent 
network connections between zones. Conduits and zones are protected with fire-
walls, but while installing a firewall in every place possible may be very secure it 
will also be expensive. This type of network setup greatly improves the network 
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security. If it doesn’t fully stop invaders it will slow them considerably. Even if 
they can breach the first layer they still have a way to go to reach any crucial parts 
of the system. Similar network setup is also possible without physical changes, us-
ing virtualization, VLAN. VEO is currently using segmentation in their IACS net-
works (Figure 3). /8/ 
 
Figure 3: VEO segmentation example 
3.5 Whitelisting 
Whitelisting exists in different contexts; all references in this text refer to applica-
tion whitelisting. Whitelisting is considered an alternative to anti-virus software. 
Anti-virus software has a list of known threats and it compares files in the system 
to those on the list. When it spots a threat it usually blocks it and notifies the user. 
This is known as blacklisting. For industrial systems this is not enough, as it doesn’t 
protect against unknown threats. In whitelisting this goes the other way. The system 
administrator creates a list of files the system is allowed to run, everything else is 
blocked by default. This provides more security than anti-virus, but not without 
flaws. Whitelists usually use hashes to identify files, while it’s nearly impossible to 
create two different files with the same hash, some whitelisted applications may 
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have flaws that allow it to be exploited /5/. Whitelisting can also use other methods 
besides hash to determine the allowed software. These include files signed by cer-
tificates from trusted authorities, and Windows Software Restriction Policies /7/.  
Whitelisting is not without its own risks. Some software create additional files when 
executed and these files are not present when the whitelist is created, therefore they 
cannot be placed on the list. This may require whitelisting entire folders, which is 
an enormous hole in the system. One of the most common ways to exploit a white-
listing solution was inserting a worm in e.g. a PDF-file (Portable Document Format) 
and then opening the PDF-file with a whitelisted program. Some systems were even 
unable to prevent execution of files when attached to command prompt data stream. 
/7/ 
Patching software may also cause big problems in whitelisting as the file database 
also needs to be updated, for this reason some claim that unpatched systems using 
whitelisting are more secure than those under scheduled patching. However this 
was not confirmed in tests. In addition, whitelisting doesn’t protect from web-based 
threats or non-executable files, which are usually spotted by anti-virus software. 
This leads to the conclusion that whitelisting may not be sufficient in replacing anti-
virus systems on its own, but should be used alongside them. /7/ 
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4 IEC 62443 STANDARDS 
4.1 General 
The standard was originally developed by the International Society of Automation 
under the name of ISA99 standard and currently utilized in the ongoing develop-
ment of the IEC 62443 series. The standard currently consists of 13 parts of which 
two are still in development. In this project we focus on parts 62443-2-3 and 62443-
2-4 (figure 4). /1/ 
 
Figure 4. Status of IEC 62443 series of standards /2/ 
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4.2 Patch management in an IACS 
Part 62443-2-3 is a technical report on IACS patch management. It can be used by 
both asset owners and product suppliers to better implement and operate patch man-
agement systems and procedures in both existing and future facilities. Patch man-
agement takes a lot of time and resources from the parties involved. Each product 
that is going to be patched has to be tested on a test system to verify that the patch 
doesn’t cause any additional security issues. Backups need to be taken before and 
after patching from the systems that are about to be patched. After installation, the 
patches have to be tested on the actual systems before resuming normal operations. 
Due to the extensive amount of work needed for patching an IACS, the patching is 
usually done during regular maintenance outages. However, some systems may be 
so critical that outages are out of the question and therefore they can’t be patched 
at all. The same can be true for obsolete control systems. Asset owners with systems 
that cannot be patched have to rely on other means of threat mitigation. This can be 
done e.g. with more strict security policies or additional network security capabili-
ties.  
Patch management can lead to several problems in the system. These problems can 
be incompatibility issues, system performance decrease or even false positives in 
security software. When vulnerabilities are found in the system, the patch needs to 
be created and applied. Given the amount of similar systems or devices some prod-
uct suppliers have, the patching is done case-by-case at the asset locations. Because 
of this fact, the attackers have the upper hand when vulnerabilities are discovered. 
Although patching an IACS takes a tremendous amount of work and sometimes 
means system outages, patching should always be considered. The loss of an IACS 
system can, in worst cases, result in loss of life. So, as stated in the standard: “Ap-
plying patches is a risk management decision.”  
The standard provides recommended requirements for asset owners and IACS prod-
uct suppliers regarding patching their IACS associated devices. 
One key to good patch management is patch information. As stated previously, 
patches have to be tested before installation. One major issue is compatibility within 
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systems; IACS are based on many different systems, OSs, databases and other com-
mercial and non-commercial IT-products. All of these have to be tested before ap-
plying new patches to the IACS. In addition, many facilities use products from mul-
tiple product suppliers. This adds a staggering amount of complexity when testing 
patches within the system. This part of the IEC 62443 standard introduces asset 
owners and product suppliers a standard way to share information about their 
patches. Vendor patch compatibility (VPC) file is introduced in the standard. VPC 
files are based on XML and are defined using an XSD file. (Figure 4) VPC files 
should be named as follows:  
Company_patch_compatibility_2016-05-05_01.xml 
The first part of this convention is the vendor name, always followed by “patch 
compatibility”. After this, the date the file was released, formatted using ISO 8601. 
The last number after the date is a possible file number if the company releases 
multiple files on a single date. /3/ 
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Figure 5: VPC file schema /3/ 
 
  21 
4.3 Establishing a patch management system 
The standard provides guidance on how to establish and maintain a patch manage-
ment system. This information is crucial to asset owners and as such doesn’t con-
cern VEO, which is an IACS service provider. The first step into a patch manage-
ment system is gathering information about the existing environment. Every piece 
of software and hardware in the system has to be checked to list versions in use. 
This information should be kept secure, because it may open new vulnerabilities in 
the system. The information needed from the system may be gathered manually or 
with an automated scanning tool. If done properly, this information can be used in 
determining what parts of the system are vulnerable when a new vulnerability is 
discovered. The standard introduces multiple ways to gather the data along with a 
list of data that should be gathered. This list of devices is called an asset list and it 
should also contain device specific information (Figure 5).  
 
Figure 6: VEO asset list sample 
The second phase is project planning and implementation activities, here the asset 
owner makes a business case, defines roles and establishes a patch deployment and 
installation infrastructure along with restoration and backup infrastructure. The next 
phase is procedures and policies for patch management, it includes monitoring, 
evaluating, testing and installing patches. The last phase, operating a patch man-
agement system, is a “run and maintain” process. /3/ 
4.4 Security program requirements for IACS service providers 
Part 2-4 of the IEC 62443 standard defines requirements for security capabilities. 
These are used to show what capabilities the service provider can provide for their 
system. Because systems can be very diverse and new products may be introduced, 
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the requirements in this standard are loose, allowing different kinds of implemen-
tations. A predefined set of requirements is called a profile. Asset owners can use 
these profiles to request a specific set of capabilities from their service provider.  
Two kinds of service providers are introduced, integration and maintenance service 
providers. Integration service providers analyze the environment the IACS is to 
control, develops the IACS and how it connects to internal and external networks, 
installs, configures and tests the system. It is also stated in the standard that this 
definition is loose and it may exclude or include some activities.  
The standard introduces maturity levels based on the CMMI-SVC model. These 
levels are used as benchmarks to state how well the asset owner’s requirements are 
covered by the service provider. There are four maturity levels in the standard: Ini-
tial, Managed, Defined (Practiced) and Improving. These are used to define Base 
Requirements (BRs) and Requirement Enhancements (REs). 
These requirements are presented in tables. The tables have eight columns, six of 
which are indicators and representations, the two last ones describe the requirement. 
These are explained and shown with an example in Appendix 1. 
Using these requirements the asset owner can define exactly what is required from 
the system it is acquiring and product suppliers can define what their capabilities 
are. This information can be used as the asset owner to choose the best product 
supplier and as the product supplier to develop products with more capabilities. /4/ 
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5 WHITELISTING AT VEO 
The most recent addition to cyber security capabilities in VEO’s systems is white-
listing. The whitelisting is applied on a monitoring system setup that is used with 
VEO’s IACS in various power plants. It is used to monitor everything happening 
in the facility. The two software packages installed to handle the whitelisting were 
McAfee Application Control and Symantec Critical System Protection, abbreviated 
SCSP. 
5.1 McAfee Application Control 
McAfee Application Control handles whitelisting by creating tasks to apply on the 
system. Creating these tasks is easy for the user and doesn’t require previous expe-
rience with the software. The software can be used without management server, but 
the use of management server allows the software to send reports to the host system 
in various forms, including system event viewer, system logs, emails and SQL da-
tabases. The agent is lightweight and allows patching host system files while oper-
ating. The software also allows memory protection. McAfee Application Control 
has known weaknesses: JavaScript and other scripts can be run, and the agent 
doesn’t monitor network or non-executable files. 
5.2 Symantec Critical System Protection 
SCSP is a more robust whitelisting tool. It offers protection on everything, includ-
ing executable and non-executable files, network and registry. However it requires 
expert level knowledge to be used to its full potential, and the whitelisting process 
is time consuming and complex. Policy rules cannot be applied without the man-
agement tool. All the tools in the software package are protected behind system user 
passwords. SCSP is not able to send event logs to the host system and patching the 
host system is not possible without fully disabling SCSP. Its complexity may also 
leave some vulnerabilities depending on the user knowledge level. 
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6 RESULTS AND CONCLUSION 
The IEC 62443 standard is built to be comprehensive, it provides information to 
various types of organizations, including asset owners, product suppliers, integra-
tion service providers and maintenance service providers. Many of these do not 
apply to VEO and, therefore, are covered only on the surface. VEO is mainly an 
integration service provider, it chooses products from product suppliers, builds the 
IACS which is then handed over to the asset owner. While the standard provides 
some information directly to integration service providers, it is not nearly enough 
to fill the thesis from only that point of view. For this reason the information about 
the standards covered is mostly introductory. In hindsight, other sections of the 
standard may have proved to be more useful. However, this thesis covers the im-
portant areas of these standards from VEO’s point of view and should save time 
when developing future systems if these areas of the standard have to be used. 
The aim was also to observe the usage of whitelisting in one of VEO’s systems, but 
the project was paused after the person responsible for the project fell ill. For this 
reason there is only a recap of the used whitelisting software covered in this thesis. 
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APPENDIX 1  1 
Requirement table sample  
Req ID BR/RE Func-
tional area 
Topic Subtopic Doc? Requirement description Rationale 
SP.04.02 BR Wireless Network Design Communications No The service provider shall have 
the capability to ensure that wire-
less protocols used in the Auto-
mation Solution are compliant 
with standards commonly used 
within the industrial security 
community and with applicable 
regulations. 
"The capabilities specified by this BR and its 
REs are used to provide confidence that wireless 
networks use protocols that have been vetted for 
use in industrial applications. 
Having this capability means that the service 
provider (1) uses a commonly accepted standard 
wireless technology in the Automation Solution 
and (2) has an identifiable process that ensures 
that the wireless technology used is compliant 
with local regulations." 
Require-
ment ID 
Base Require-
ment/ Require-
ment Enhance-
ment 
Main func-
tional area 
Topic addressed 
by the require-
ment 
Subtopic ad-
dressed by the re-
quirement, may 
have multiple 
Documenta-
tion required to 
be provided to 
asset owner? 
Text of the requirement Background, justification, and other aspects. 
